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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has revolutionized
modem criminal procedure by invoking the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial to strike down several sentencing innovations, including the federal
sentencing guidelines themselves.' This revolution has been led by members
of the Supreme Court who follow an "originalist" method of constitutional
interpretation.2 In this Article, I wish to discuss whether a similar
"6originalist" revolution may be on the horizon in civil cases governed by the
Seventh Amendment's "right of trial by jury.",3
In particular, I wish to discuss a series of provocative articles written by
Professor Suja Thomas. In these articles, Professor Thomas has argued that
one of the most important procedural innovations in civil litigation-the
summary judgment device that has been available to judges since the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted all the way back in 1938-is
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., 2000, Harvard
Law School. I am indebted to James Oldham, John McGinnis, Richard Nagareda,
Nicholas Rosenkranz, Suja Thomas, and the participants at a workshop at Georgetown
Law School for their comments on previous drafts. I am also grateful for the research
assistance of Aaron Chastain, David Dunn, and Alison King.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-92 (2000).
2 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?,
94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005). There are, of course, many different permutations of
originalism. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J.
CONTEmp. L. IssuEs 409, 412 (2009) ("[D]isagreement among originalists persist[s]" as
to "what fixes original meaning ... )
3 U.S. CONSr. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a july, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.").
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inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.4 Although Professor Thomas's
arguments are based primarily on the requirements of Supreme Court
precedent, her analysis is grounded almost entirely in history, and she has
invoked an originalist methodology in her work.' In this Article, I wish to
take these invocations seriously and ask whether her analysis would satisfy
an originalist that summary judgment is unconstitutional. Although her
historical analysis is impressive, I think it may be a bit premature to draw any
conclusions from it as a matter of originalism.
Professor Thomas's analysis largely begins and ends with a comparison
of summary judgment to the procedural mechanisms that existed in 179 1.* In
1791, she notes, only juries and not judges were allowed to resolve cases
where the sufficiency of a party's evidence was in dispute.' Today, by
contrast, summary judgment permits judges to resolve some cases in which
the sufficiency of the evidence is in dispute.' From these facts, Professor
Thomas concludes that summary judgment is unconstitutional. 9
I express no view on whether this analysis is sufficient as a matter of
Supreme Court precedent. I question, however, whether it is sufficient as a
matter of originalism. In order to conclude that summary judgment is
unconstitutional, I think an originalist would need to know something more
than simply the fact that summary judgment permits judges to resolve
evidentiary disputes that they could not resolve in 1791.10 Not every little
thing that juries did in 1791 was understood to be unchangeable in the
absence of a constitutional amendment.1 ' It is probably not the case, for
example, that, if juries were given forty-five minutes for a lunch break in
1791, it would be unconstitutional to give them thirty minutes today. That is,
an originalist would need to know whether there was something special about
resolving evidentiary disputes in 1791 that made them rise to the level of
4 See generally Suj a A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93
VA. L. REv. 139 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas 1]; Suja A. Thomas, The Unconstitutionality
of Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1613 (2008) [hereinafter
Thomas 11]; Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply
to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1667 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas 111].
5 e Thomas 11, supra note 4, at 1616 ("The Seventh Amendment ... requires ...
originalism."); Thomas 111, supra note 4, at 1683.
6 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 148-5 8.
7 e id
9 See id. at 15 8-60.
9 e id
10 See infra Part Ill.
I See infra Part III.
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constitutional importance.'12 In particular, an originalist would need to do
things like compare the text of the Seventh Amendment against a founding-
era lexicon, look for statements from those in the founding generation on the
question, or consult the original purposes of the Seventh Amendment in
order to discern whether this particular feature of the jury system in 1791 was
one that the Seventh Amendment was understood to preserve.'13 In other
words, in order to assess whether a practice that existed at the time of the
Founding was something required by the Constitution, an originalist would
need to invoke a frame of reference external to the practice itself, a frame of
reference that informs why the practice might or might not have been
understood to be constitutionally required. 14 I take no position on what
criteria an originalist should look to in assembling this frame of reference.
For this Article, it is sufficient to note that Professor Thomas has yet to focus
on assembling this frame of reference.
Indeed, this external frame of reference is important not only because it
can inform whether the resolution of evidentiary disputes was understood to
be constitutionally important at the Founding, but also because it can inform
whether other changes made to the federal courts since then might cast any
constitutional concerns posed by summary judgment in a different light.'15
Needless to say, the federal judicial system has changed a great deal since
179 1. At the same time that summary judgment has arguably diminished the
ability of juries to resolve cases, there have been a number of other
innovations that have arguably enhanced the ability of juries to do so.1
Perhaps the modern civil system hath giveth to juries more than it hath taketh
away. In order to assess whether any of these other changes is relevant to
whether summary judgment infringes the Seventh Amendment, an originalist
would, again, need to begin with a frame of reference external to the
practices themselves. Although it is, again, beyond the scope of this paper to
develop an external frame of reference against which these changes can be
evaluated, I note that there are at least a few reasons to believe an originalist
might find at least some of these other innovations relevant to an assessment
of whether summary judgment is constitutional.'17 Professor Thomas has yet
to consider these other innovations.
12 See infra Part Ill.
13 See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
14 See infr Part 11I.
15 Seinfra Part Ill.
16 Seinfra notes 5 5-65 and accompanying text.
17Se infra Part MI.
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In Part 11 of this Article, I briefly explain the contours of the modern
summary judgment device and why Professor Thomas thinks it is
unconstitutional. In Part I11, I explain why it would be difficult for an
originalist to draw an inference about which jury practices were
constitutional at the time of the Founding without invoking a frame of
reference external to the practices themselves. I further explain that this
external frame of reference may be important not only to drawing inferences
about what was and was not important at the Founding, but also to assessing
whether any other changes since the Founding might bear on the
constitutionality of summary judgment. I close by describing some of the
other procedural innovations that have come to the federal judicial system
since 1791 and by asking whether an originalist might care about these other
innovations when assessing whether summary judgment is constitutional.
II. THE MODERN SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEVICE AND PROFESSOR
THOMAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, judges are permitted to enter
"summary judgment" before trial in favor of one of the parties "if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'18 As this Rule has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, it not only permits judges to
enter judgment for one of the parties whenever there are no factual disputes
in a case and the only questions remaining to be decided are legal ones, but it
also permits judges to make some assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence that has been uncovered in discovery (and can therefore be
introduced at trial) to determine whether a "reasonable jury" could find for
one of the parties.' 9 If the judge does not believe that a reasonable jury could
find for one of the parties based on the evidence that has been uncovered,
then the judge is permitted to enter judgment in the case for the opposing
party. 20
Professor Thomas argues that the summary judgment device is
unconstitutional because the Seventh Amendment guarantees the "right of
trial by jury,"2'1 and the summary judgment device allows judges and not
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgment will
not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.").
20 See id.
2 1U.S CONST. amend. VII.
922 Vol. 71:5
2010] SUMAMRY JUDGM ENT92
juries to resolve cases. 2 She begins her analysis with the premise, found in
the Supreme Court's precedents,2 that the Seventh Amendment should be
interpreted to protect the "substance" and "core principles" of the jury trial as
it existed in England at the time the Amendment was ratified in 1791.*2 She
then performs an analysis of the various procedural devices that existed in
1791 and shows that, although there were several procedural devices in 1791
that permitted judges to enter judgment for a party either before or after trial,
juries, not judges, resolved all disputes as to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a party's case .25 That is, all of these devices permitted judges to
enter judgment for a party only in the absence of any factual disputes at all-
either because one party had admitted all the factual allegations of the other
party (as with the demurrers to the pleadings and evidence) ,2 the factual
disputes had already been resolved by agreement or by the jury (as with the
special case),2 or there was no evidence whatsoever on a required element of
a party's claim (as with the compulsory nonsuit).2 This, Professor Thomas
argues, is in contrast to summary judgment, which, as I noted, allows judges
to resolve some cases today where there is a dispute as to the sufficiency of
the evidence.2
22 See Thiomas 1, supra note 4, at 143 ("Cases that would have been decided by a
jury under the common law are now dismissed by a judge under summary judgment.").
23 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)
(interpreting the Seventh Amendment to "preserve the substance of the common-law
right as it existed in 179 1"). It should be noted that the Court has started with the premise
that the Seventh Amendment protects the right to trial by jury as it existed in England
rather than the United States because the jury-trial practices in the states were so
divergent. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750) ("Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of
any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England,
the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.").
2 4 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 147 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment should
preserve "the substance of the English common law jury trial in 1791"); Thomas 111,
supra note 4, at 1683 ("[Tjhe Court should embrace originalism to interpret the Seventh
Amendment" and apply "the English common law ... in 1791 when the Seventh
Amendment was adopted ... )
25 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 143, 148-5 8.
2 6 See id. at 148-54.
2 7 See id. at 156-57.
2 8 See id. at 155-56.
2 9 See id. at 143 ("Under [the summary judgment] standard, in contrast to under the
common law, the court [rather than a jury] decides whether factual inferences from the
evidence are reasonable, [and] applies the law to any 'reasonable' factual
inferences . .)
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Professor Thomas acknowledges that there was one procedural device in
1791 that permitted judges to make an assessment of the sufficiency of a
party's evidence (the motion for a new trial), but she argues that this device
did not permit a judge to enter judgment for one of the parties, as summary
judgment does, but, rather, permitted a judge only to order a newjury trial.30
Thus, Professor Thomas argues, even if a motion for a new trial was granted
by a judge, the ultimate assessment of the sufficiency of the parties' evidence
would be performed by a (new) jury."' As a result, Professor Thomas
concludes that the "substance" and "core principles" of the jury trial in 1791
included the exclusive right of juries to resolve cases.3 Insofar as summary
judgment permits judges to decide some of these cases today, Professor
Thomas concludes that summary judgment is unconstitutional. 3
Although there is at least one scholar who has disputed Professor
Thomas's historical analysis,3 I am willing to assume that Professor Thomas
has her history correct and that it is indeed true that, through summary
judgment, judges today are resolving cases that juries resolved in 1791. In
the next Part, however, I question whether this historical fact alone would
satisfy an originalist that summary judgment is unconstitutional.
111. ORIGINALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE FRAME OF REFERENCE
Professor Thomas's analysis more or less proceeds in the following
form: (1) she looks at the world as it existed in 1791 when the Seventh
Amendment was ratified; (2) she finds that only juries resolved cases where
the sufficiency of the evidence was disputed; (3) she asserts that jury
resolution of evidentiary questions therefore formed part of the "substance"
or "core principles" of the 1791 jury trial; and (4) she uses this assertion to
conclude that judges, rather than juries, cannot constitutionally resolve such
disputes today.3" This analysis may or may not be sufficient for the purposes
of existing Supreme Court precedent. I am skeptical, however, whether it is
sufficient for the purposes of originalism.
30 See id at 157-58.
31 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 158.
32 Seid. at 143 ("Cases that would have been decided by a jury under the common
law are now dismissed by a judge under summary judgment.").
33 See id at 158-60.
34 See Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1625,
1630-41 (2008).
3 5See generally Thomas 1, supra note 4.
924 Vol. 71:5
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It goes without saying that not every little thing that juries did in 1791
was understood to be unchangeable in the absence of a constitutional
amendment. As I noted above, it is probably not the case that, if juries were
given forty-five minutes for a lunch break in 1791, it would be
unconstitutional to give them thirty minutes today. In order for an originalist
to assess whether a practice that existed at the time of the Founding was one
that was also constitutionally required, I would think an originalist would
need to know something more than simply the fact that the practice existed.
In particular, I would think an originalist would need some sort of frame of
reference external to the practices at the Founding themselves in order to
separate those practices that were constitutionally important from those that
were not. An originalist might look at a number of different things in
assembling this external frame of reference. For example, an originalist
m-ight look to the text of the constitutional provision and juxtapose it against
a founding-era lexicon.316 Or, when the text is too ambiguous, an originalist
might examine statements made by those in the framing generation on the
question at issue.3 Or, if no such statements can be found, an originalist
might consult the original purposes of the constitutional provision.3 I take no
position on the criteria an originalist should examine to assemble the external
frame of reference. My only point is that an originalist would need to
examine something besides the jury trial in 1791 itself to discern which
features of the jury trial in 1791 were thought to be constitutionally required
from those that were not.
Professor Thomas has yet to focus on this external frame of reference.
Although she asserted that jury resolution of cases where sufficiency of the
36 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (1994) (arguing that originalists should
exhaust dictionaries and grammar books before deeming a constitutional provision
ambiguous).
3 7See, e.g, John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 774 (2009) ("When the interpretation of language was unclear, the
interpreter would consider the relevant originalist evidence-evidence based on text,
structure, history, and intent-and select the interpretation that was supported more
strongly by the evidence.").
3 8 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 303 (2007) (advocating an originalist approach that looks to "what the people who
drafted the text were trying to achieve [and] . . . what principles they sought to endorse");
Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
Originalism, 108 CoLum. L. REv. 529, 580 (2008) (advocating an originalist approach
that looks to "the original understanding of the principle that was embodied in the text");
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 37, at 774.
20101 925
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evidence was in dispute formed part of the "substance" and "core principles"
of the jury trial, she did not say how she came to this conclusion.3 She did
not say what she consulted to define the substance and core of the Seventh
Amendment.4 She merely observed that juries always did these things in
1791, and then concluded that these things must therefore be part of the
substance and core of the jury's 1791 domain.4 I question whether this sort
of analysis would satisfy an oniginalist. I would think a thorough examination
of some of the aforementioned indicia of the original understanding of the
Seventh Amendment would be necessary before an originalist would
conclude that it was thought important that juries resolve cases where the
sufficiency of the evidence was in dispute.4 Although Professor Thomas at
some points in her later work discusses some of the original purposes of the
Seventh Amendment, she does not focus her constitutional analysis on these
purposes.4 The focus of her constitutional analysis, again, is the practices
themselves that existed in 1791.
It is true that originalists sometimes rest their analyses of whether
modem practices are constitutional without focusing on an external frame of
reference, but, rather, by focusing on whether practices like them existed at
the time the relevant constitutional provision was ratified. Justice Scalia, for
one, sometimes finds various practices constitutional because those practices
existed at the time of ratification."4 He has, for example, concluded that the
death penalty and public prayer are constitutional because these practices
existed during the periods in which the Bill of Rights was adopted and then
incorporated against state governments through the Fourteenth
3 9 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 159-60 (asserting that the three-fold "substance" or
"core" of the Seventh Amendment was (1) "the jury or the parties determined the facts"
and "[t]he court itself would never decide a case without such a determination of the facts
by the jury or the parties;" (2) "a court would determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury verdict only after the parties presented evidence at trial, and
only after a jury rendered a verdict;" and (3) "a jury, not a court, decided a case that had
any evidence, however improbable").
4 0 See id
41 See id ("The court itself [at the time of the Founding] would never decide a case
without such a determination of the facts by the jury or the parties.").
4 2 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
43 See Thomas 11, supra note 4, at 1680-83.
44See Thomas Colby & Peter Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 253
(2009) ("Justice Scalia has frequently decided cases on the basis of the proposition that if
the first Congresses and presidents engaged in a practice, then the Framing generation
must have expected and thus understood the practice to be constitutional. . . .)
926 Vol. 71:5
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Amendment.4 This form of originalism is sometimes referred to as
"expected application originaliSM.,,46 Originalism of this sort is not so much
concerned with what particular constitutional provisions mean in the
abstract,47 but, rather, with "how people living at the time the text was
adopted would have expected it would be applied" in particular
circumstances. That is, "[i]f the Framers would have expected the
Constitution to permit something, then it is permitted today, and if they
would have expected it to preclude something, then it is precluded toa.'4
There is considerable rhetorical force to expected-application
originalism; it would be strange indeed for those who ratified a constitutional
provision to continue to engage in practices that they themselves understood
to violate that provision. Nonetheless, this simplified version of originalism
is not foolproof.50 But even if it were, I do not think it would be available to
Professor Thomas. This is the case because expected-application originalism
can be invoked only to establish that practices that existed at ratification are
constitutional, not to establish that practices that did not exist at ratification
are unconstitutional. When a practice existed at ratification, an originalist can
plausibly conclude without further analysis that the practice must be
constitutional because, as I noted, it would be strange for those who ratified a
constitutional provision to continue to do things that they themselves
understood to violate the provision. But when a practice did not exist at
ratification, an originalist cannot draw the converse inference so easily. This
is the case because the expected-application inquiry for a practice that did not
exist at ratification would seem to be a hypothetical inquiry; it would seem to
ask whether those who ratified the constitutional provision would have
thought the practice was constitutional had it existed. There is no way to
answer such a question without invoking an external frame of reference. It is
not enough to analogize from the practices that did exist because, as any
lawyer knows, any two things are both similar to one another and different
45 See Colby. supra note 38. at 574 n.252 (2008).
46 Balkin, supra note 3 8, at 296.
47~ For this reason, expected-application originalism is sometimes derisively called "I
Have No Idea Originalism." See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 737 (2009) ("The argument is essentially,
'I have no idea what this provision means. But whatever it means, it can't prohibit this,
because the Framers approved of it."').
4 8 Balin, supra note 38, at 296.
49 Colby, supra note 38, at 573.
50 See, e.g., id at 580 ("It is possible that the framing generation misunderstood the
way in which the principle that they enacted would apply to particular facts, or that their
understanding of the facts was mistaken ... )
2010] 927
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from one another in a countless number of ways. The question is whether the
similarities or differences are relevant ones, and this requires a frame of
reference external to the practices themselves. Professor Thomas, of course,
is making just this form of argument: that something that did not exist when
the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791-judicial resolution of cases
with the sufficiency of evidence in dispute-is unconstitutional. 5' As such,
she may need to assemble an external frame of reference before an originalist
would be satisfied with her analysis.
It should be noted that assembling this external frame of reference is
important not only to discern which features of the 1791 jury trial were
constitutionally important and which features were not. As I explain in more
detail below, it might also be important to identify whether there have been
any other changes to the federal civil system since then that affect the
constitutionality of summary judgment. Needless to say, the federal judicial
system has changed a great deal since 1791.*5 Although it is true that the
advent of summary judgment may have diminished the role of the jury, it is
possible that other changes may have simultaneously enhanced it.5" That is,
when the forest rather than the trees of the modern federal civil system is
compared to the system that existed in 1791, it might look better from the
perspective of the Seventh Amendment. 54 Whether it does will depend on
what the Seventh Amendment means; it will depend, again, on a frame of
reference.
For example, perhaps the most significant procedural innovation in the
federal system since 1791 has been the dramatic change in pleading rules.
The English and American common law pleading practices "were designed
not simply to control the level and types of cases heard, but as a mechanism
to keep litigants out of the courtroom." 5 "[Plleading was the central focus of
51 See Thomas 1, supra note 4, at 158-60.
5 2 fIndeed, it should be noted that there is a very good reason why judges in 1791
may not have resolved cases by assessing the sufficiency of the parties' evidence before
trial as they do today with summary judgment: the parties did not have much evidence
before trial in 1791 because there was little-to-no pre-trial discovery available to litigants
in English common law courts. See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT AN4D ANGLo-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 10 (2006) ("There was no pretrial
discovery.) Stephen Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694-97 (1998).
53 See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
5 4 See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
55 Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal,
33 H~Av. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1107, 1111 (20 10).
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law suits, and cases were often won or lost on the pleading skills of the
attorneys."5 Things are much different today under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The very motivation behind the adoption of the Federal
Rules in 1938 was to eradicate the technicalities of common-law pleading.5"
Now, plaintiffs need only set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."5 8 Moreover, judges now are
explicitly instructed to bend over backwards not to resolve cases* on the
pleadings, but to construe the pleadings liberally "so as to do justice."5 9 It is
true that the Supreme Court has recently tightened pleading rules a bit, but
things today are still nothing like they were at the time the Seventh
Amendment was ratified .60 The changes in pleading rules have undoubtedly
affected the role of the jury: cases that were lost or issues that were
abandoned in light of the pleading rules in 1791 now have at least the chance
to be resolved by juries.
There have been other changes that have given litigants a greater chance
to come before juries today than they had in 1791. For example, at the time
of the Founding there was little opportunity to aggregate a large number of
similar claims into one action; this meant that individuals with small claims
not worth litigating on their own did not have much access to courts at all, let
alone an opportunity to put their claims before juries .6 '1 This changed with the
advent of the modem class action device, which, after the amendments to the
Federal Rules in 1966, permits similar claims to be aggregated in a vast array
of cases in federal court.6 Moreover, even when claims were worth
litigating, it was more difficult to bring them to court at the Founding than it
is today because contingency fees were banned in early America (as they are
5 6 RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 11 7 (5th
ed. 2009).
5 7 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 648 (1994); see also Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 573-74 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the intent of the drafters of
the Rules to depart from English common law pleading tradition).
5 8 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
5 9 FED, R. Civ. P. 8(e).
6 0 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (applying the
plausibility standard established in Twombly to all civil claims); Twombly, 550 U.S. at
562, 570 (requiring plaintiffs to plead facts that make their claims "plausible").
6 1 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 166, 218, 268-69 (1987) (discussing the very limited group litigation
procedures available in English courts during the founding era).
6 2 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 811, 818 (20 10).
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in England) and did not become accepted here until the middle of the
nineteenth century.6 In addition, at the time the Seventh Amendment was
ratified, federal courts followed the English "loser pays" rule on attorneys'
fees; it was not until 1796 that the Supreme Court adopted the "American
Rule" where each party pays its own fees.64 Most commentators believe that
all these changes have made it easier for litigants to bring suit today than in
the past.6
Might any of these other changes matter to an originalist assessing the
constitutionality of summary judgment? Professor Thomas has yet to
confront this question, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to answer it
in any detail. But I will offer a few observations. First, there are some
reasons to believe that the text of the Seventh Amendment buttresses
Professor Thomas's worry that summary judgment poses constitutional
concerns insofar as it permits judges to resolve factual disputes. Although the
Seventh Amendment does not say what aspects of "trial by jury" it seeks to
"6preserve[]," a hint on this point might be found in the Amendment's later
prohibition on "any Court" 'reexamining "fact[s] tried by a jury."6 This later
focus on the resolution of factual disputes suggests that such disputes may
have been at the core of the Seventh Amendment's jury trial ight. On the
other hand, even if these disputes were at the core, insofar as the Amendment
explicitly prohibits only reexamination of such disputes, and not examination
of such disputes in the first instance, one might argue that the Amendment
protects only second guessing juries, not preempting juries, which, of course,
is what summary judgment does. Consequently, I am unsure if an originalist
would rely on the text of the Seventh Amendment alone to assess whether
summary judgment poses constitutional concerns and whether those concerns
6 3 See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Con tracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 23 1,
239 (1998) (chronicling the adoption of contingency fees by state courts). The United
States Supreme Court approved contingency fees in 1853. See Wylie v. Coxe, 56.U.S.
415, 419-20 (1853).
6 4 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796).
6 5 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States ofAmerica, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 691 (1997)
(characterizing the American Rule as a "powerfuil mechanism, facilitating access for both
plaintiffs and defendants"); Karsten, supra note 63, at 231, 240-41, 256-60 (discussing
the incentives to litigate with contingency fees). See generally Edward F. Sherman, From
"Loser Pays " to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with
Access to Justice, 76 Thx. L. REv. 1863 (1998) (discussing the incentives to litigate under
the American versus English Rules).
6 6 U.S CONST. amend. V11.
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might be overcome by the other aforementioned procedural changes that
have arguably enhanced the role of juries since the Founding.
Second, an examination of what may be the most prominent purpose
behind the Seventh Amendment both bolsters Professor Thomas's concerns
about summary judgment as well as the possibility that those concerns might
be overcome by the aforementioned jury-enhancing changes to the federal
system. Many scholars believe that the most prominent purpose behind the
Seventh Amendment was to empower ordinary citizens with some say in the
outcome of federal cases so that they could hinder the work of unjust federal
judges--or even unjust Congresses.6 As commentators have put it, "the
Seventh Amendment was added to the Bill of Rights in order to serve as a
check on unrepresentative, unaccountable federal judges"68 and to "ensure[]
that central authorities in a state, provincial, or national capital could not
impose their will on local communities."69 Indeed, in some of her later work,
Professor Thomas appears to agree that this was one of the original purposes
of the Seventh Amendment.7
If this was indeed one of the original purposes, then Professor Thomas is
correct to worry that summary judgment presents constitutional questions,
not so much because the device permits judges to resolve factual disputes in
particular, but because the device prevents juries from hearing cases that they
would have heard in 1791, and, as such, insulates judges from some
interference juries might have wielded in 179 1. But it is also true that at least
one of the aforementioned j ury-enhancing procedural changes may offset this
jury-diminishing one. As I noted above, there are cases and issues that have
the opportunity to come before juries today that could not have done so in
67See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
REcoNSTRUCTION 82-83 (1998) ("The dominant strategy to keep agents of the central
government under control was to use the populist and local institution of the jury," and
that the jury-trial Amendments "were centrally concerned with the. . . danger that
government officials might attempt to rule in their own self-interest at the expense of
their constituents' sentiments"); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MNNm. L. REv. 639, 670-71 (1973) (noting the desire to "achieve
results from jury-tried cases that would not be forthcoming from trials conducted by
judges alone"; in particular, "the protection of debtor defendants; the frustration of
unwise legislation; the overturning of the practices of courts of vice-admiralty; the
vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government; and the
protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges").
68 MARCUS ET AL., supra note 56, at 53 1.
69 WlimE. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93
IOWA L. REv. 1653, 1656 (2008).
70 See Thomas 1I, supra note 4, at 1680-83.
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1791 because they were lost or abandoned on the pleadings."' Juries could
not hinder the work of judges in these cases in 1791 because judges resolved
the cases on the pleadings well before trial .72 Today, in light of the notice-
pleading regime of the Federal Rules, juries have at least the chance to have
their say in all these cases. If the original purpose of the Seventh Amendment
was to cast a particular balance between the power of juries and judges, then
the changes in pleading rules may be just as relevant to the constitutional
analysis as the advent of summary judgment; when a constitutional provision
seeks to preserve a balance of power, it is difficult to assess whether it has
done so when the weights are removed from one side of the scale.
By contrast, the other procedural changes since 1791 mentioned above-
the advent of class actions, contingency fees, and the American Rule on
fees-might not be relevant to the Seventh Amendment analysis. This is the
case because these changes do not affect the balance of power between
judges and juries; these changes simply increase the number of cases that
come to court in the first place, where they will be subjected to whatever
balance of power between judges and juries otherwise exists. But this is
exactly my point: in order to assess what is relevant and what is not, one
needs to assemble some sort of external frame of reference. Professor
Thomas has yet to focus her energies here.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the summary judgment device has been with us for many
decades, Professor Thomas thinks it is unconstitutional because it permits
judges to resolve a set of cases-those where the sufficiency of a party's
evidence is in dispute-that could only be resolved by juries at the time the
Seventh Amendment was ratified. Although her analysis is based primarily
on the requirements of Supreme Court precedent, it is also grounded almost
entirely in history, and she has invoked an originalist methodology in her
work. As such, it is worth asking whether originalists would be satisfied with
Professor Thomas's analysis. I think they might find her analysis thus far
premature. In order to conclude that the Seventh Amendment requires juries
to resolve cases where the sufficiency of a party's evidence is in dispute, an
originalist would want to know more about the jury trial in 1791 than the fact
that juries had the exclusive power to resolve such disputes. Not every little
thing that juries did in 1791 was understood to be unchangeable absent a
constitutional amendment. In order to separate the things that juries did that
were important to the Seventh Amendment and the things that they did that
71 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
72 SeMARcus ET AL., supra note 56, at 116-17.
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were not, one must assemble a frame of reference external to the jury
practices themselves. This external frame of reference might be assembled
from many places-a comparison of founding-era lexicons to the
constitutional text, an examination of founding-era statements on the
question, an assessment of the original purposes of the Seventh Amendment,
etc.-but it has to be assembled from somewhere. Professor Thomas has not
yet focused her energies here. There is more work to be done before an
originalist might conclude summary judgment is unconstitutional.

